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BOOK REVIEW
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL OIL AND THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By Michael Tanzer. Pp. x, 435.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. $12.50.
In this book author Michael Tanzer focuses upon the
familiar and prolific theme of oil's impact upon the underdeveloped countries (UDC's). Tanzer does, however, approach
the subject from a different angle: he concentrates upon
oil's effects on the oil-importing UDC's rather than its
effects upon the oil-exporting UDC's. One expects at first
that this change in emphasis would produce a vastly different
account of the plight of the UDC's. It turns out, however,
that despite the basic dissimilarity between importing and
exporting of oil, the problems facing the importing UDC's
are quite similar to the well-known problems long experienced
by the oil-rich exporting UDC's. This is so because those
problems, insofar as they involve oil in its international
aspect, all arise from the same root cause. Simply stated,
that cause is the monopolistic character of the ownership
and distribution of the world's crude oil. This monopoly
extends from the derricks in the oil fields of the producing
countries to the retail markets of the finished products
elsewhere. Of course it is not a "pure" monopoly in the
sense of single ownership and control, but since international
oil is dominated by only seven major companies that do not
operate in what may be called a real atmosphere of competition, the resulting situation is justifiably characterized
as monopolistic.
Tanzer is realistic in recognizing this pervasive
aspect of the international oil predicament, and he uses it
to construct a basic model upon which to base his discussion.
Several factors comprise this model: first, the seven major
companies that produce most of the world's crude oil; second,
their control of the tanking fleet that transports the oil;
and third, their ownership or control of the companies in
the importing UDC's that buy the crude oil for refining and
retail. As a result, the major companies are able to control
both supply and prices all up and down the line. This control
makes it possible for these companies to discourage oil
development in the importing UDC's and to resist nationalization
and other forms of governmental interference by UDC's that
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must rely upon oil imports. Howqver, one disturbing force
in this monopolistic model is the entrance of 20 to 30
minor oil companies into the international oil market.
These "minors" constitute a competitive element which
threatens to upset the "majors'" control of the market.
After setting up the described model, Tanzer devotes
most of the remainder of his book to an analysis of the
effect upon this model of the six interacting forces which he
sees as influential in the international oil field. In this
regard the author breaks with the traditional approach of
analyzing this complex subject in terms of only three forces,
namely the exporting countries, the importing countries, and
the oil companies as "intermediaries." This is a significant
departure since, as Tanzer's model demonstrates, the major
oil companies' influence extends well beyond the role of
mere "intermediary."
The first important force examined by the author is
that of the oil companies themselves. Predictably, their
major interest is the economic one of maximizing profits.
A second and related force is that of the governments of
the oil companies' home countries. Since these countries
are primarily Western, they tend to promote the expansion
of capitalism as well as the furtherance of their cold war
objectives. The interests of these two forces frequently
collide with those of the third, the oil-exporting UDC'so
But since none of the exporting countries has enough
exportable oil to enjoy a supply monopoly, and since many
of their governments are dependent upon Western support to
maintain political power, each of them is to some extent
deterred from taking steps inconsistent with the Western
interests.
Russia, the fourth international force, sees oil as a
tool of foreign policy by which to gain influence in the
UDC's; this they accomplish by stirring discontent with
the West and capitalism, by encouraging public rather than
private ownership of oil facilities (thus incidentally
promoting the idea of socialism), and by making oil imports
to UDC's a form of foreign aid by long deferral of payments.
World organizations such as the United Nations and the
World Bank form the fifth international force. In the main
these organizations promote the goals of the West and encourage
private investment since they are financed primarily by the
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Western governments.
The sixth and last (in every sense) force in international oil is comprised of the more than 100 oil-importing
UDC's. Among the common characteristics that these UDC's
share are a lack of native energy sources, a shortage of
goods for foreign exchange, and a heavy reliance upon the
Western countries for foreign aid.
Given the varying, competing, and often incompatible
interests of these several forces, one can imagine no end
of real and potential conflicts. Perhaps the most striking
one is the dilemma in which both the importing and exporting
UDC's find themselves by reason of international oil's
monopolistic character. Quite obviously, the oil companies'
goal of maximizing profits is frequently inconsistent with
the interests of the UDC's. The major goal of these countries,
Tanzer suggests, is to achieve rapid economic development
with maximum political independence. To do this the
importing UDC's need vast amounts of the earth's great energy
producer, oil; only with this essential energy source can
these nations advance toward their goal. This crucial need
creates a distinct bargaining disadvantage for the importing
UDC's. To get oil from the Western exporters they are
subject to the previously described monopolistic system;
but in obtaining oil from the Soviet Union, the UDC's
get a mixed bag of less expensive prices and greater political
commitment. Moreover, the choice of East or West also leads
frequently to an involuntary choice of public versus private
ownership. No matter what choice is made, the particular UDC
involved is almost inevitably drawn into the cold war power
struggle amidst constant pressure for ideological alignment.
This perplexing situation presents real difficulties
for the UDC's in developing a national oil policy. Because
of its high-energy potential and low cost, oil offers the
only realistic opportunity for rapid economic development, and
yet it cannot be obtained except in an atmosphere of conditions
that are incompatible with this end goal. Thus whether
supplied by East or West the exploitative potential of oil
in either economic or political terms is substantial. As
Tanzer's analysis aptly illustrates, it is absurd to speak of
"imperialism" through international oil strictly in terms of
the Western powers; if anything, the Soviet Union's use of
oil as an instrument of foreign policy is even more directly
imperialistic. In any event, the dilemma posed for the leaders
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of the UDC's is enormous, while the alternatives are limited.
Severe measures, such as nationalization of company facilities, may have short-range political popularity, but they
often result in loss of both a vital oil supply and a
source of foreign aid; playing to the galleries by taking a
tough stand against foreign "imperialists" may seem momentarily inspiring, but it is usually shortsighted both
politically and economically. At the other extreme, a complete hands-off policy may have considerable political
unpopularity because of the hue and cry that the government
permits the exploitation of its people while enjoying no
substantial benefits from the importation of oil commodities.
With a dearth of viable middle-ground policies, it can be
seen that any approach adopted is likely to have serious
political and economic repercussions. Having few alternatives and little bargaining power, it is understandable that
the UDC's have largely been unable to develop oil policies
tailored to serve their own best interests.
It is this major dilemma that makes Tanzer's book
important. His analysis in terms of six rather than the
traditional three competing forces is a real contribution,
since it places the issues in more realistic perspective.
Recent events such as the Libyan oil crisis and the granting
of new oil-exploration licenses in Malaysia and Indonesia
tend to confirm the soundness of this approach. While
discussing specific issues in international oil as well as
examining specific UDC's such as India, the emphasis tends
to be on further analysis of old problems rather than on the
recommendation of new solutions. The work is well documented,
and it draws upon the insights of the author's own experience
in India and with Standard Oil of New Jersey. If the book
has a major weakness, perhaps it is in the lack of proposals
for correcting the many problems which it explores. This,
however, does not detract from its considerable merit as
an analytical expose of the underlying difficulties within
a realistic framework.
Jason Gordon Reynolds
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